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Location theory is often downplayed in the orthodox development economics discipline
because the limitations of natural endowments are less restrictive in the wake of mass
transformation and industrialization. However, good determination of location-friendly
economic development policies has largely been responsible for the development in
China. Moreover, these policies have sacrificed the balanced development discipline,
which has been regarded as an untouchable rule in the traditional socialist method of
development. By first reviving the importance of location theory using the economic
development in China as a primary example, this paper then extends location theory to
the Korean international development strategy and the East Asian region. While the
Chinese regional development strategy was based on economically plausible conditions
supported by location theory, Korea’s strategy was biased toward a political rationale,
which disregarded the logic of the market. The long-term success of government initiat-
ed special economic zones depends heavily on finding compatible location elements sup-
ported by economic factors. Thus, regional development should be based on rational
consideration of economic needs, practical comparative advantages, and diversified pro-
motional stimulations faithful to location theory.
INTRODUCTION
In traditional Chinese culture, fengshui ( ), a geomantic omen, was
believed to influence the fortunes of a family and, under this custom, the
location of houses or tombs were viewed as crucial. This tradition also
appears in Korean history. For example, if a man became a high-ranking
official, he commonly consulted an expert on fengshui on how to utilize the
land passed down from his ancestors. Furthermore, villages were generally
built with the hills behind and the water in front based on fengshui.1 The fact
that temperate terrains used as village sites were located by testing where
the snow melts the fastest remains intriguing to this day. 
With the launch of the new millennium, no other country has come close
to China’s economic or political dynamism. The 1978 economic reform and
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1 In Chinese, towns were formed according to the beishan mian shui ( ).
open-door policy (gaigekaifang2) marked a milestone in China’s economic
development in which the highly centralized economy gradually trans-
formed into a more dynamic and market-oriented system. The result has
been startling: China’s GDP exploded to eight-times its original in 20 years.
In 2002, with its enormous population of 1.28 billion people, China emerged
as the sixth largest economy in the world following the US, Japan, Germany,
France, and Great Britain. Inundation of foreign investment has spurred the
output of both domestic and export goods, which earned China the nick-
name “The Global Manufacturer (shijie gongchang).” In 2002, China absorbed
US $52.7 billion of foreign direct investment, surpassing the United States as
the world’s largest FDI recipient. Despite this phenomenal record, China’s
economic achievements remained unbalanced occurring unevenly in certain
sectors and regions. The most dynamic region in China became the coastal
areas near Hong Kong and the Taiwan straits; where the most of favorable
policies were granted.
Unbalanced regional development, though, is common in the initial
stages of development. In fact, many countries have deliberately adopted
“zoning policies” to utilize land more efficiently, often through mediated
allocation of functional business districts. In Korea, urban planning was first
adopted during the early 1960s with the launch of full-scale development
plans initiated by president Park Chung Hee. In the United States, zoning
policies protect residential areas from bustling business districts to provide
better living environments for residents. Moreover, through national indus-
try development agendas, governments have constructed industrial clus-
ters, which range from steel, chemical to export goods production. In Korea,
for instance, the Masan Export Processing Zone was set up in 1960s to
attract investment from neighboring Japan; a policy duplicated by China in
the late 1970s. Also, certain Korean cities, like Pohang and Ulsan, rapidly
expanded from villages to large-scale cities accommodating large popula-
tions because of the construction of steel mills and automobile factories. In
the examples above, the importance of location in the economic develop-
ment of specific countries is apparent.
While orthodox economic theory stresses the importance of “economies of
region” in addition to the concept of “economies of scale” and “economies
of scope,” it, nevertheless, underplays the role of location elements in
explaining economic activities.3 Ironically, even under the large size orienta-
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tion of globalization, countries have continued to reveal interest in optimiz-
ing the size of their national coverage.4 This tendency is exemplified by the
increasing discussion on regionalism, which has a direct correlation with
location and economic activities. Location elements are, therefore, still very
important in a practical sense. 
Since 1949 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) initiated regional devel-
opment planning on several occasions, sometimes defying traditional wis-
dom. Cai and Lin (2003) explain China underwent vast changes as a result
of the regional development strategies that were implemented throughout
the years, beginning with the Three Regional Areas, Third Line
Construction Strategy, the Coastal Area Development Strategy, and finally
the Go-West Policy. The “three regional areas” simply refers to the grouping
of the 31 provincial areas into eastern, middle, and western region accord-
ing to their respective locations. The Chinese statistical authority adopted
this practice in all its publications. Development of industrial cities has
occurred near populated areas, or areas with convenient transportation, or
coastal areas that allowed access to international interactions. The revival of
Shanghai in the mid-1990s is a typical example. Concerned for China’s
national security in the early 1960s, Mao Zedong established the “Third Line
Construction” strategy, which protected China against possible invasion
from the United States and the Soviet Union (Cai and Lin, 2003). It conclud-
ed in total failure, however, as huge amounts of resources were misallocat-
ed. Deng Xiaoping rectified the Third Line Construction Strategy by taking
the Coastal Area Developing strategy in the late 1970s. Turning into a new
millennium, the Chinese political leadership has once again switched its
strategies, this time with the Go-West Policy to decrease the income dispari-
ty between the coastal and inner areas and to spark new momentum for
growth.
The Chinese example reminds us of the importance of location theory,
which has been greatly overshadowed by the emphasis placed on markets
and institutions by capital theorists and the rising importance of distribu-
tion of income. One of the key factors of China’s exceptional growth over
the past 25 years has been the regionally unbalanced growth strategy. China
was highly praised for the gradualism of its development projects, in which
four SEZs (special economic zones) were opened as the first batch, then 14
coastal cities as the second batch, prior to the development of the delta
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areas. This strategy, termed xianfulun, consciously developed coastal areas
first. In this respect, location theory has been instrumental in the unparal-
leled economic growth of China. The government policies based on China’s
geographical characteristics and resources’ endowments have proved to be
very efficient.
While Korea has experienced some degree of success on the national
level, the results have been less than satisfactory on the regional level up to
now.5 In the past, Korea considered developing the Tumen River Delta Area
encompassing North Korea, Northeast China, and even Russia.
Explorations into the development this North East Asian border-area, how-
ever, produced results that were far below original expectations and the
project was eventually abandoned. The gap between the ideal and reality
stemmed from the inferior nature of that area, which had a small market,
poor infrastructure construction and underdeveloped transportation, an
uneducated labor force, and an unfavorable climate. In recent days, howev-
er, regional development strategy is once again stirring interest in Korea.
The new government under President Roh Moo-hyun has revealed a desire
to assume the role of the so-called Business Hub of East Asia. 
With inauguration of new president Roh in February 2003, the new
regime announced to accelerate the development of the Korean economy by
assuming the role as a North East Asian Business Hub. It is still far too early
to determine the achievements of this government policy. However, China’s
experience demonstrates that the success of a country’s regional develop-
ment process hinges on whether it is in keeping with natural location.
The following sections first summarize the location theory and then apply
location theory to China’s unbalanced regional development policy focus-
ing on two Special Economic Zones: Shenzhen and Xiamen. Subsequent sec-
tions explore the function of Hong Kong and determine whether it will shift
to a booming area such as Shanghai. This example is then contrasted with
Korea’s experiences in the Tumen River Delta Area Development and its
efforts to become the Business Hub of Northeast Asia. This paper, thus, con-
trasts the successes and failures of location theory at the regional level
applying to China’s regional economic development and Korea’s regional
development initiatives.
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LOCATION THEORY REVISITED
In the field of orthodox economics, location theory of economic activity
has always been less emphasized. Orthodox economics put more emphasis
on the behavior of economic agents and production factors. Mark Blaug
(1997) argues “curious distain of location theory on the part of mainstream
economics” and “this neglect largely continues to this day.” Though location
theory is not cited as often as some other economic theories, it does indicate
a general and effective rule in economic activity and should be paid due
regard when firms and households make plans on where to produce and
consume. Location theory is also relevant to a country’s regional economic
development strategy. 
The origin of location theory can be traced back to Von Thünen, who was
a German economist in early 19th century. He originally aimed to explain
the birth of cities by using location theory. Von Thünen envisioned an isolat-
ed town supplied by farmers in the surrounding countryside. He assumed
that crops differ in both their yield per acre and their transportation costs.
He also allowed for the possibility that each crop could be produced with
different intensities of cultivation. Von Thünen showed that competition
among farmers leads to a gradient of land rents that declines from a maxi-
mum at the town to zero at the outermost limit of cultivation. Each farmer
faces a trade-off between land rents and transportation costs. Differing
transportation costs and yields among crops result in a pattern of concentric
rings of production. In equilibrium, the land-rent gradient must be such as
to induce farmers to grow just enough of each crop to meet the demand,
and it turns out that this condition together with the condition that rents be
zero for the outermost farmer suffices to fully determine the outcome. As
the Von Th?nen town grows bigger and bigger with the development of
urban industries, the rings also expand outward. Thus a town’s develop-
ment leads to a development of related areas, many of which are sure to
bring about a country’s prosperity. Von Thünen took the existing town as
given, which was not the case in reality, but it does not reduce the value of
his theory. 
There are many other complementary works on this subject. Alfred
Marshall (1920) first introduced the concept of external economies by dis-
cussing the advantages of producing in an “industrial district.” According
to Marshall, there are three reasons why a producer might find it advanta-
geous to locate near other producers in the same industry. First, a geograph-
ically concentrated industry supports specialized local providers of inputs.
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Second, a concentration of firms employing similar workers creates a labor
market pooling; workers are less likely to remain unemployed if their cur-
rent employer performed poorly, and firms would be more likely to find
available labor if they did well. Finally, geographic proximity facilitates the
spread of information.
Peter Nijkamp (1984), a Dutch economist and editor of the Handbook of
Regional and Urban Economics, argues the regional development potential
depends on regional potentiality and mobile production factors.6 The poten-
tiality factors determine the regional development potential, although the
impacts of these factors may differ, depending on their mobility, indivisibili-
ty, non-substitutability, polyvalence and non-exclusiveness. By means of
these five characteristics the regional potentiality factors may be distin-
guished from other productive resources. According to the relative contri-
bution of infrastructure categories to the regional development potential,
Nijkamp divides infrastructure of a certain region into 12 categories: trans-
port, communication, energy supply, water, environment, education, health
care, special urban (local), sportive and tourist facilities, social facilities, cul-
tural facilities, and natural endowment. When there is laissez-faire, the com-
bination of these infrastructures determines the allocation of the production
factors like capital, labor and technology in the most efficient way. The gov-
ernment’s interference in the economic activity is effective and helpful only
when its policy goes together with these given infrastructures; otherwise it
would end up in failure. Therefore, a comprehensive study of these infra-
structures is needed before a government makes any regional development
policy.
Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University explains underdevelopment is most-
ly ascribable to transportation disadvantages. Many African countries and
Middle East Asian countries, for example, are classified as having semi-arid
climates, “land-locked” (exports and imports are difficult to transport), and
lacking large mineral deposits. Sachs is one of the few orthodox economists
to become famous for emphasizing the importance of location in launching
development strategy. He also listed limitations of land-locked countries in
expanding their economic prosperity. 
These arguments not only emphasize the importance of location factors in
national level but also in regional level. When we apply location theory to
the financial industry, the issue becomes why a financial center grows and
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develops in one particular location and not in others. The financial sector
has historically developed in response to the need for financial services
from the real sector — namely, the mining, agriculture and manufacturing
industries. At early stages of development, financial activity arises in a par-
ticular place because of the information passing through that location due to
trade flows or real sector activity. Porteous (1998) argues that there were two
levels of geographic elements that explain the growth of particular financial
centers. The first is the immediate hinterland of the center, pointing to the
area over which the center is the dominant supplier or consumer of goods
or services; and the second is the broader region comprised of various inter-
acting hinterlands which determine how particular city-hinterland systems
fit into global or regional patterns. A two-way flow of information is
required for any industry’s development, from the hinterland to the core
city and from the core to peripheral areas. Such flow is largely affected by
natural geographical features and complemented by man-made develop-
ments such as transport networks, which countervail original disadvan-
tages. The value of information flows is expected to grow over time. This
may be initially shaped by natural endowments, but the patterns of
exploitation of natural resources and of secondary and tertiary sector devel-
opments in the region are equally, if not more, important in the long run.
Another factor to consider when erecting a financial center is the poten-
tial for profitable exploitation. This potential is determined by soundness of
the financial infrastructure, judging whether the existing financial markets
are mature enough to support high trading volumes that mollify liquidity
risks. There may be a trade-off between locating close to the source of new
information and locating to where the information can be used profitably.
Meanwhile, technological, economic and institutional changes are constant-
ly transforming the information hinterlands of financial centers and under-
mining natural location advantages. The strengthening of transportation
networks and inter-connected information webs enable the mobility of pro-
duction factors and, ultimately, reduce the reliability on natural endow-
ments. Some cities are favored over others during the shift of world eco-
nomic patterns not only because of their natural endowment, but also for
their basic infrastructures, which once built up form additional advantages.
Finally, Nijkamp finds laissez-faire government policies are preferable
when implementing regional development strategies. Similarly, Hoover
(1948: 277) argues government policies on regional development should be
determined on the strength of the existing infrastructure and powered by
competition among self-interested individuals, not simply motivated by the
politician’s will. The policies can only be justified when they aid firms to
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make more knowledgeable selections on location, increase inter occupation-
al and geographic mobility for labor, and remove unnecessary barriers to
trade and competition. The costs associated with a development policy
must always be weighed against the securable benefits. Negligence or
underestimation of these costs often has often had disastrous consequences
even for theoretically sound policies.
APPLICATION TO CHINA’S REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY
Over the past two decades, China, one of the largest countries in the
world, has stunned the world with its rapid economic development and
phenomenal economic achievements.7 In 1978, when China decided to open
her doors and stimulate her economy, the GDP was a meager US $43.67 bil-
lion. In 2002, however, with the success of the reform policies, China’s GDP
miraculously rose to US $1,155.82 billion, with an average annual growth
rate of 9.3% on GDP and 7.9% on GDP per capita since 1989. The GDP in
2002 was twice the size of 1990 figures and ranked sixth in the world after
the US, Japan, German, France and the UK (World Development Report, 2003).
Analysis on China’s rapid development must include discussions on the
optimal regional development strategies, especially the 4 special economic
zones (SEZs): 14 coastal open cities (COEs), 3 delta areas, central and west-
ern China, and the Go-West Policy. In addition, there are hot debates on
whether Hong Kong will continue to assume its role as a regional and
international financial center or possibly be replaced by Shanghai or
Wuhan, which had been the historical centers in China.
When China launched its reform and open-door policy, political leaders
decided to develop the eastern coastal cities first expecting spillover effects
to spread along the whole coastal area and eventually into inland China.
This decision was a good application of the location theory, which empha-
sizes the infrastructure and inborn natures of certain areas. Generally speak-
ing, China’s eastern coastal area has a favorable climate and a convenient
transportation network. Its industrial infrastructures and trade traditions
existed prior to the founding of the People’s Republic of China and was,
thus, much more advanced than the other areas in China. Shanghai, for
example, was considered as the Paris of Asia.
In 1980, critical changes in the first step of implementing China’s econom-
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ic reform and open door policy took place as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou
and Xiamen were designated as four Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The
open door policy expected these SEZs to attract foreign investment,
advanced technology and management skills to the mainland. Before imple-
menting a full-scale open door policy, the Chinese leadership intended to
test the effectiveness of the market economy. In an apt comparison, Deng
Xiaoping summarized the functions of a special economic zone as “the win-
dow of technology, management, knowledge and foreign policy” (Deng
Xiaoping, 1993). 
Based on the successful experience of the four Special Economic Zones, 14
new coastal cities were designated in 1984 to accelerate national economic
development by absorbing larger amounts of foreign capital, technology
and experience.8 These coastal cities were granted greater favorable govern-
ment policies and more decision-making power was released to the local
governments so as to improve the efficiency of these port cities and increase
their competitive advantages in the world market.9
In the following year, construction intensified further opening China’s
economy. The Yangtze River Delta Area, Pearl River Delta Area and South
Fujian Delta Area were to be developed as three coastal delta economic
zones, which could link cities and neighboring rural areas together and
stand as the vanguard in China’s economic transformation. Studies estimate
more than 200 million people mainly engaged in trade and manufacturing
reside in these areas. The gross output of industries in these areas account
for half of entire country’s total output.10 In 1988, the Hainan province was
separated from the Guangdong province and assigned as the Hainan
Special Economic Zone. By then there had formed an opening belt along
China’s eastern and southern coast line, including five special economic
zones and 293 coastal cities and counties, with 280 million people covering
426,000 square kilometers in China. In 1999, the “Go-West Policy” was
launched in order to stimulate the local economies in the central and west-
ern areas, reduce the gap between eastern and western China, and improve
the business environment and living conditions in the West. The Go-West
Policy marks the final stage of the gradual opening agenda, completing the
full-scale open market reforms .
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Until the early 1990s, most economic activities in China, including the
coastal development plans, were carried out according to the planned-econ-
omy system. However, even without the central government’s favorable
measures accorded to coastal areas, like the preferential tax policy, the areas
with these inherent advantages would have likely developed to the same
degree. “An invisible hand” would have gradually drawn capital and well-
educated labors into these areas anyway since the production factors inde-
pendently allocate themselves in an efficient manner in the market. Had not
the government set up the four Special Economic Zones and other cities,
other autonomous “Von Thünen towns” would have appeared along the
long coastal area of China. These towns would have become centers of that
region leading the development of local economy and contributing to
China’s overall economic development. 
With precise timing and thorough understanding of the different infra-
structures of each city, the SEZ policies, nevertheless, played a significant
part in the rapid growth of China’s economy. When the Special Economic
Zones were first initiated, China has just survived the Ten-Year Cultural
Revolution. A century-long closed-door policy had left China far behind the
world. During this time most industries reverted back to infant stages due
to the lack of capital and modern technology. The Chinese government
chose the proper location and proper time to transform the economy and
regain what had been previously lost. The open-door policy proved to be
the correct choice for these cities to attract the much needed foreign invest-
ment, technology and modern experience. The section below provides a
more detailed analysis of two SEZs examining the applicability and effec-
tiveness of location theory in China.
Case of Special Economic Zone: Shenzhen and Xiamen
Enjoying the title of the “South Gate to China,” Shenzhen city has become
the symbol of the economic reform and open door. Before the reforms,
Shenzhen was a small coastal village in the Guangdong province located
near the Hong Kong border adjacent to the Pearl River Harbor. Presently,
Shenzhen is one of the most important ports that connect China with the
world. Covering 327.5 square kilometers, it is endowed with abundant eco-
nomic resources ranging from tropical plants to diverse sea products. The
close connection with overseas Chinese brought in large investment from
successful overseas Chinese, which greatly contributed to Shenzhen’s initial
development.11 Low land rents and other favorable tax policies in Shenzhen
have continued to seize the attention of foreign investors.
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Shenzhen, which used to be a small town with a population of 20,000 has
transformed into a booming metropolis through sustained economic pros-
perity of the construction industry. Shenzhen’s annual growth rate averaged
30% and soon “Shenzhen Speed” became the main driving force for China’s
national economic development inspiring other cities as well. Shenzhen’s
prosperity mainly derives from the successful application of location theory.
First of all, neighboring Hong Kong was crucial to Shenzhen’s success.
Hong Kong directly supplies capital and also provides many conveniences
for the foreign capital looking to invest in Shenzhen. At present, 80% of the
foreign capital in Shenzhen comes from Hong Kong and the lion’s share of
investment from foreign countries comes into Shenzhen via Hong Kong (Li,
2000).12 Hong Kong also supplies Shenzhen with advanced technology and
facilities. Among all the technology and facility suppliers to Shenzhen,
Hong Kong ranks second closely following Japan. Through intensive con-
tact with Hong Kong, Shenzhen gained the modern management methods
and experience needed to improve efficiency and profits. Shenzhen’s
achievements in turn set an example to the inland economies where man-
agement skills were desperately required. Much useful information has also
spread into Shenzhen from Hong Kong. Advanced telecommunication and
service facilities in Hong Kong have provided Shenzhen with new technolo-
gies and market information, accelerating its export-oriented economic
development. Lastly, by trading with Hong Kong, Asia-Pacific’s trade cen-
ter, Shenzhen has benefited by exploring the overseas market channels.13
Shenzhen has emerged as a window to internal financing, international
trade, technology transfer, and personnel training for the region. The actual-
ization of this function was made possible only through years of horizontal
economic and technological cooperation between Shenzhen and Hong
Kong.14 Through this window, cooperative funds and investment were
established promoting the inland economy. Shenzhen has made remarkable
achievements by absorbing foreign capital and associating with inland areas
since the establishment of the special zone.
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Situated in the south of Fujian Province facing the Taiwan Strait, the 13.1
square kilometer Xiamen SEZ is another successful case of location theory
application in China.15 Since its establishment in 1980, the Xiamen SEZ has
been granted province-level authority in economic management. It also has
a relatively developed transportation and telecommunication network: the
Xiamen International Airport is one of the four leading international air-
ports in China with first-rate services and facilities and the Xiamen harbor is
one of the ten major seaports in China. In 2002, Xiamen’s total amount of
import and export ranked at the third in China. As for education, the
Xiamen University serves as a platform that attracts and cultivates intellec-
tuals for local development.
Historically, Xiamen has been an important port for foreign trade on the
eastern coast of China. Xiamen is famous as the hometown of some 350,000
overseas Chinese. Xiamen and Taiwan have a close link in geography and
lineage. People in both places speak the same dialect and observe similar
customs.16 At present, over 70% of the Taiwanese population is estimated to
originate from the South Fujian ancestry. As the facilitator for trade and cul-
tural exchanges between Mainland China and Taiwan, Xiamen plays an
important role in promoting the relationships between two sides. As
Shenzhen benefited from Hong Kong, Xiamen’s development was made
possible because of Taiwan. By the end of September 2001, the Taiwanese
investment to Xiamen topped US $3.46 billion reaching 1,569 projects. Its
trade volume with Taiwan by the end of June 2001 rose to US $7.75 billion. 
Since the Xianmen Special Economic Zone was established, the local gov-
ernment has been making enormous efforts to create a favorable environ-
ment for economic and trade cooperation with Taiwan. The Xiamen govern-
ment improved many related services, set up an exclusive Taiwan invest-
ment zones, carried out the pilot work of direct shipping across the Strait so
as to integrate Taiwan’s capital, equipment and management with the local
market, labor and talents with Mainland China. Thus, Xiamen has become
an important channel through which Taiwanese investment enters
Mainland China.
Through constant efforts, Xiamen has evolved from an isolated and back-
ward island city into a scenic port with strong infrastructure facilities active-
ly promoting domestic and international economic exchanges. Xiamen has
become an important window leading the nationwide open reform policies.
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Since 1978 when China initiated the opening and reform policy, Xiamen’s
gross domestic product, gross industrial product and local finance income
has maintained a rapid growth rate of 18.4%, 23.4%, and 19.7%, respectively,
for 20 years.
Constructing Financial Centers: Hong Kong vs. Shanghai
The examples in the sections above have examined the results of location
theory applied to the national level. In this section, analysis of location theo-
ry takes place at the regional and international level specifically examining
the issues that surround the competition between the dominant regional
financial centers — Hong Kong, Shanghai and Wuhan. When choosing a
financial center, natural conditions must be considered first. Then consider-
ation on the artificial advantages like infrastructure construction and
encouragement of trading activity follows. In order to elaborate on the
application of location theory on regional financial centers, a comparison on
three cities of Shanghai, Wuhan and Hong Kong in terms of their financial
characteristics of location is given. These cities are instrumental to China’s
economic development. The precise functions of location theory are appar-
ent as these cities develop into financial centers. 
Hong Kong is now the world’s seventh largest trading economy and the
world’s ninth largest trader in services. It has the world’s most service-ori-
ented economy, generating more than 80% of its GDP through services. The
well-established infrastructure, well-educated labor, developed market sys-
tem, and long tradition of openness are key components positioning Hong
Kong as the economic and financial center of not only in Asia but also the
entire globe .
Hong Kong is the third biggest international financial center. There are no
major constraints inside or outside Hong Kong. The city provides equally
suitable environments for local banking institutions and foreign financial
institutions. Many financial institutions in Hong Kong participate in local
and overseas financial activities. Hong Kong offers several advantages for
investors: excellent telecommunication facilities, globalized finance, the
usage of English by the general public, many practical entrepreneurs and
talented professionals, an efficient banking sector, low income taxes and
free-harbor policies, minimum foreign exchange controls and efficient, fair
and transparent markets. 
Hong Kong’s uniqueness stems from its human resources. Hong Kong
boasts not only an impressive array of mainland Chinese who have been
educated and trained in the West, but a standing force of lawyers, accoun-
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tants and other professionals. In addition, Hong Kong’s supremacy origi-
nates from its history. The political legacy bequeathed by the British legal
and economic system offers a more mature market economy effectively allo-
cating resources. Moreover, English has long been integrated into its socioe-
conomic fabric. A wide using of English eliminated communication barriers
with foreigners who transferred knowledge and skills. Meanwhile, the
inherited Cantonese kept Hong Kong linked with mainland China which is
now its biggest trading partner. This bilingual workforce became a unique
and attractive advantage for Hong Kong during globalization.
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the Hong Kong government’s
centralization of important foreign banks and financial institutions acceler-
ated the development of its financial center. Fewer limitations and less inter-
ference in business activity motivated competition and information flows
among the commercial banks and securities and insurance companies oper-
ating in Hong Kong. Free of transactional activities also produced other con-
veniences, which welcomed foreign companies and institutions to invest in
the local market. In this regard, Hong Kong is expected to retain its role as
an international financial center for the time being. Also, it will remain a
gateway for foreign investment into China, and a trade hub for the Pearl
River Delta of southern China as well.
However, Shanghai, once nick-named as “Paris of the East,” threatens
Hong Kong’s status as a regional and international financial center.
Shanghai has the biggest scale of economy of the four municipal cities in
China.17 This region recorded a 540.9 billion Yuan (equivalent to US $65.4
billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002. It attracted US $5 billion in
actual foreign direct investment increasing foreign trade to US $73 billion
and comprising 12% of China’s total trade. Located on the mouth of the
Yangtze River Delta — which is coincidentally the most populous, the most
developed and the wealthiest area in China — Shanghai has achieved rapid
industrialization supported by the vast fertile agricultural land located in its
periphery. 
Positioned at the mouth of Yangtze River, Shanghai links the mainland to
the Pacific through active trading. Functioning as an eastern gate to China,
Shanghai is the only city possessing two international airports. Pudong
International Airport is China’s largest cargo airport and second largest pas-
senger airport, while Hongqiao airport is one of the busiest domestic air-
ports. Shanghai’s seaport has surpassed Taiwan’s Kaoshiung to become the
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17 Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing are the only municipal cities, which have
provincial level authority.
fourth largest container port in the world. The transportation network is so
well developed that people from Shanghai can access other domestic or
international cities by air, train or ship. Shanghai also boasts the largest
industry basis and technical center. 16 national key labs offer a dominant
advantage in this field. In recent years, information technology has become
the engine of local economic growth enabling great advances in the service
and finance industries and ensuring continuous rapid growth. 
As the prototype of modern Chinese banks, Shanghai has a 150-year his-
tory in the financial industry. International financial activities took place as
early as 1847 when the first British bank branch was established. Foreign
banks from Germany, Japan, Russia, France and US soon followed suit and
eventually located in Shanghai as well. By 1936, a total of 29 foreign banks
opened in Shanghai. From 1927 to 1937, Shanghai’s financial industry was
so prosperously that it became the biggest domestic and regional financial
center in East Asia. At the time, Shanghai had money market, capital mar-
ket, foreign exchange market, gold and silver market. The Shanghai Gold
Market was the biggest in East Asia issuing domestic currencies and absorb-
ing other Chinese and foreign companies.18
The Chinese government is now in the process of developing Shanghai as
an international financial and trade center. Shanghai already has a sound
financial system composed of an array of market instruments covering
bonds, foreign exchanges, money, futures, forward, and gold. Shanghai has
more than 3,300 financial institutions with more than 80,000 working
employees. China’s financial system reform bore fruit in 2002 with the
establishment of the Shanghai Gold Exchange completing Shanghai’s efforts
to become an international financial center. The Shanghai Stock Exchange is
the 13th largest among 200 stock exchange markets in the world and second
after the Tokyo Stock Exchange in Asia.
LOCATION DETERMINATION IN CHINA 187
TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF REGIONS (year of 2001)
Population GRP (US $ Per capita income
Area (km2)
(million) billion) (US $)
Hong Kong 672 1,091 167.5 24,926
Shanghai 1,327 6,340.5 59.7 4,499
Wuhan 758 8,467 16.2 2,137
Source: China’s Statistical Yearbook, 2003.
18 Around that time, the foreign currency was also circulated as medium of exchange and
store value in Shanghai.
More importantly, as the core city of the Yangtze Delta, Shanghai has
motivated the economic integration of neighboring cities, which are also
rapidly increasing local economic development. Injected with huge amounts
of foreign investment, the Yangtze Delta has become the center of the
Chinese economy with a large labor force, sound infrastructure and abun-
dant land. Larger numbers of multinationals have relocated their headquar-
ters to Shanghai from Hong Kong, Beijing and Singapore due to these char-
acteristics. The flow of information and movement of production factors to
and from its periphery facilitating profitable exploitation attest to
Shanghai’s role as a legitimate financial center.
Shanghai and the Yangtze Delta mutually benefit from an educated labor
force, considerable natural resources, stable economic environments, high
investments, advanced skills and knowledge, scientific research, etc. With
the support of enormous economic resources in the Yangtze Delta,
Shanghai’s infrastructure is in the process of being upgraded and modern-
ized. The city boasts an advanced science and technology base and an abun-
dant supply of well-trained professionals. The interrelationship between the
real and financial sector is best described by Porteous (1998): 
Not only does the value of the information on the real sector in the hin-
terland shape the strength of the financial center which is the gateway to
the region, but the strength of the financial gateway may in turn promote
economic development in the hinterland by providing better financial
services at more competitive rates.
Another competitor to Hong Kong is Wuhan, the capital city of the Hubei
province. In fact, location theory reveals that development of Wuhan into a
financial center of Central China is very feasible. Located in central China,
Wuhan was one of the four famous cities that prospered by engaging in
trade during the Ming dynasty.19 This city produced a large economy, an
advanced culture, and mature financial and commercial markets hundreds
of years ago. During the 19th century, Hankou, an area in Wuhan, was
forced to open its gates to foreign merchants. From 1865 to 1931, the export
quantity of the Hankou Port was the second largest in China after Shanghai.
Historically, Wuhan had been a large financial center second only to
Shanghai. Before the anti-Japanese war, Jianghan Road in Wuhan was
referred to as the “Hankou Wall Street.” 
Wuhan is the most prominent city in central China enclosing 8,467 square
kilometers and 8.31 million residents. The Hanshui River, the largest branch
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19 Other cities were including Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou.
of the Yangtze River, runs through the city of Wuhan, providing a conve-
nient water transportation. Located at the junction of the Beijing-
Guangzhou railway and the Yangtze River waterway, Wuhan connects 9
provinces reaching Shanghai in the East, Chongqing in the West,
Guangzhou in the South and Beijing in the North. Also, the Wuhan Port is
one of the largest river ports in the mainland with an annual cargo handling
capacity of 40 million tons. The Tianhe airport in Wuhan is the fourth
biggest in China, with direct flights to many domestic and foreign cities.
When the Chinese government adopted the Go-West policy, Wuhan
assumed a more important role of connecting its hinterland. In terms of
transportation, most cities in China are within the reach of Wuhan thanks to
its developed water, land and air transportation network. In terms of com-
munication, Wuhan has easy access to information and knowledge from its
hinterland. Wuhan’s status as a financial center in Central China stems from
its strong tradition of commercial activities and sound financial infrastruc-
ture founded when it was once one of four financial centers. Wuhan has
advanced scientific and research abilities, ranking third behind Beijing and
Shanghai. There are 35 colleges, 736 scientific institutes and 10 national labs,
which produce a well educated work force. The impressive development of
high-tech knowledge has enhanced the productivity and competitiveness
Wuhan. 
During the process of China’s economic development, Wuhan’s financial
industry thrived and the volumes of savings and lending increased steadily.
Among the 17 national banks, only the Shenzhen Development Bank has
not opened its branches in Wuhan. There are more than 2,200 financial insti-
tutes and 9 foreign financial institutions including 7 offices and 2 branches.
Many experts believe that the “bank density” has a lot to do with the local
economy and banking industry. Based on these measurements, Wuhan is
ranked as fifth largest banking industry following Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The insurance industry also developed rapidly
in Wuhan. At the end of 2000, there were 52 security companies and 84
related divisions. These numbers indicate the potential of Wuhan as a finan-
cial center in China and Asia.
However, the underdevelopment of the Central Area inhibits Wuhan’s
drive to become a regional financial center. Compared with the Yangtze
Delta and Pearl River Delta, the Central Area has fallen far behind in terms
of infrastructure, information communication and industry productivity.
Lacking a rich hinterland, it will be difficult for Wuhan to develop into an
international financial center at least for the time being. With the deepening
of China’s Go-West Project, however, the central areas will gradually devel-
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op through information, technology and capital flows from the more pros-
perous coastal areas enabling Wuhan to assume a larger role in the region.
Hong Kong’s role as a regional financial center will continue for another
few decades. However, the rapid growth in other cities has caused the lead-
ers in China to search for the optimal division of labor between Hong Kong
and other domestic. In 2003, for example, Mainland political leaders wor-
ried about fast decline of Hong Kong’s economy affected by the rise of
neighboring areas. As a result, the CEPA (Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangement) was agreed upon by both the Chinese and Hong Kong gov-
ernments. At least in the medium term, the Hong Kong economy seems to
be maintaining the same advantages it had since the first outbreak of the
Opium War 150 years ago. As such, while Shanghai and Wuhan are “emerg-
ing economic powerhouses” in the domestic level, their relationship with
Hong Kong is more complementary than competitive.
APPLICATION TO KOREA’S REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY
As we have seen above, location theory has worked very well in China’s
regional economic development strategy at the national level (SEZs) and the
international level (Hong Kong as a regional financial center). The Korean
government should have considered location theory before implementing
regional development policies either in the national or international level.
Objectively speaking, Korea achieved greater success in domestic regional
development and witnessed failure internationally. In this section, we focus
on the analysis of two regional development strategies of Korean govern-
ment utilizing location theory; the Tumen River Delta Area Development
Project and the Business Hub Project of East Asia under president Roh Moo-
hyun.
Tumen River Delta Area Development Project
In 1992, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched the
Tumen River Delta Area Development Program (TRADP) as a regional
development program inviting five countries: China, South and North
Korea, Russia, and Mongolia. The TRADP intended to turn the Tumen River
Delta Area into an international trade center. Each country expressed strong
interest in developing this territory and only the Hunchun local government
in Northeast China, Rajin-Sonbong in North Korea and Posyet in East
Russia voiced some concern. 
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The prospects of developing this area into a regional trade hub was very
bright in the beginning. First, the TRADP managed to recruit several coun-
tries that support the goal of the UNDP. Second, the area could serve as a
transportation center between Northeast Asia and Europe. Moreover, geo-
graphically it was well-positioned to serve as a production base covering
Northeast Asian markets. Third, the TRADP itself had the potential to
become a large consumer market with a population of 35 million people.
Opportunities existed for the manufacturing of light consumer goods.
Fourth, the presence of rich natural resources, such as timber, allowed good
investment opportunities for processing industries. Finally, the region’s
scenic landscape and the famous Changbai mountain range on the Sino-
Korean border offered the potential development of a tourism industry.
Allured by such potential, the concerned parties all paid a lot of attention to
this region. South Korea also acted actively during this period but it did so
for its own interests.20
While the prospects were bright, a decade has passed without any signifi-
cant achievements. Most projects attracted little attention from the investing
parties. Although the UNDP imagined this area as a second Shenzhen, the
TRADP was a failure except for the partial development of the Rajin-
Sonbong in North Korea. Some experts criticized the project as wasting
money, labor, resources and time. This case taught an important lesson to all
the participants. 
Why did TRADP not develop as well as the SEZs in China? Following the
location theory, we find that this area lacks the infrastructure mentioned by
Nijkamp to actualize the governments’ expectations. The Tumen Delta was
located in a remote area with poor transportation facilities. Even though
several new roads and railways were built over the course of the years,
national sovereignty proved to be an insurmountable barrier restricting the
movement between countries and lowering efficiency. Moreover, the
Northeast Asian region is one of the most complicated regions in the world
still retaining cold war tensions. Despite some improvements, political and
military instabilities prevail. Uncontrolled instability could seriously dam-
age the TRADP and without a stable political environment, economic devel-
opments will continue to remain conservative. The divergent nature of the
political economies of Northeast Asia has produced low levels of economic
interdependence. In 1996, the national economies of the DPRK and
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20 Korea has additional interest of opening dialogue channel with North Korea through this
project. As a result, the investments by the South Korean were the largest among the parties
amounting to over $100 million.
Mongolia were the only two countries in the Northeast Asia sub-region to
have a high level of interdependency. Because the Tumen lies in a barren
area bordering on China, Russia and North Korea, it lacks the necessary fac-
tors for economic development. Large investments are necessary to reinvig-
orate the project but individual investors are overly cautious because of the
nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. Raising funds from international
institutions is also limited due to the non-membership status of Russia and
North Korea in international financial institutions, such as the Asian
Development Bank. 
The Northeast Asian Business Hub Strategy Pursued by the New Korean Regime
Korea’s decision to become the business hub in North East Asia is another
international regional development strategy. Former Korean President Kim
Dae-jung set the basic policy direction for the Business Hub project at his
New Year address in January 2002. According to the government’s Action
Plan, the area near the Incheon International Airport will be designated as a
special economic zone, as well as the areas near the Busan and Gwangyang
ports. Incheon will become a business hub, while the two port cities will
become logistics hubs. The main aim of government’s plan is to improve the
business environment and living conditions for foreign business, which
offer tremendous benefits to the Korean economy. 
Korea’s locational advantages are explained below. First of all, Korea is
located between two economic giants — Japan and China. These three coun-
tries account for 20.6% of the world GDP. Secondly, Incheon has 43 cities
with populations over one million within a three-hour flight radius. It is
well positioned to become a hub for both air passengers and freight in
Northeast Asia. Busan is already the world’s third largest container port.
With further expansion, Busan, along with the port of Gwangyang, will
become a major transshipment hub and distribution center in Northeast
Asia. Finally, through years of accumulation, the Han River Miracle has pro-
duced a sound infrastructure. Some Korean industries have even acquired
competitiveness in the world market, such as electronics, automobiles, ship-
building and steel industries. Many world-class R&D bases have been estab-
lished, as well. 
Although Korea is endowed with favorable geography and has a relative-
ly sound infrastructure, it is still far from being the hub among Northeast
Asian economies, namely Japan, China and Russia. The disadvantages of
Korea are so dismaying that they threaten to permanently damage this pro-
ject. First, Korea has a much smaller market than China and Japan. Also, the
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Korean market has been shrinking recently as China’s huge market attracts
more and more foreign investment. Though Japan continues to suffer from
its stagnant economy, the high-income consumers provide a large domestic
market. Second, even though Korea continually expands its domestic infra-
structure, it lags behind the logistics network in Hong Kong and Singapore.
Compared with Japan and China, Korea is also weaker in advanced marke-
tization, openness and transparency of laws and regulations, flexibility of
labor market and stable labor relations. Being far less internationalized than
Hong Kong or Singapore, another serious problem for Korea is the language
barrier.
Third, although Hong Kong and Singapore have been developing into
international trade centers in Asian for more than half century, Korea has
just launched its internationalization program in 2002. Meanwhile, there is
potential competition from Shanghai and Taiwan, whose economic ambi-
tions are growing with their rapid development. Korea is not as competitive
as Hong Kong and Singapore in terms of infrastructure and not as active as
Shanghai in welcoming foreigners. Korea has often been blamed by foreign
investors for having one of the strongest protectionist sentiments. 
Fourth, Korean labors are much more expensive than those in China and
other Southeast Asian countries. The Chosun Daily, a leading Korean news-
paper, once remarked: “The average wage for blue-color workers at the
domestic production plants of the nation’s top business groups is as much
as 10 times more expensive than wages for workers at overseas plants.” The
average annual wage for Korean blue-color workers in 21 plants of the six
biggest firms in the country and their subsidiaries amounted to about W36
million each, about 10 times higher than the average of W3.4 million for
workers at the groups’ plants in China.21
Finally, while Korea’s position in the middle of the Northeast Asian coun-
tries brings favorable geographical advantages, political instability in the
region remains very high. The most disconcerting problem is the nuclear
threat posed by North Korea. Military ventures are detrimental to the eco-
nomic environment and Korea’s hub strategy. In the face of such conflicts,
Korea has to secure national security by negotiating with neighboring super
powers, like China, Japan, and even the US.
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21 See the details from 
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200307/200307310008. html.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
China’s economic development strategies evince the relevance of location
theory, which gives priority to the natural geographical advantages, when
discussing regional economic development. However, in international com-
petition, human factors also matter, especially in the long run. Man-made
infrastructure plays just a significant role as the natural infrastructure. Both
the inborn advantages and constructed infrastructure determine the future
of the concerned region. 
China’s brilliant performance in the recent past have largely been through
accurate policy implementations. However, China may confront some prob-
lems in the future as urbanization accelerates and the local governments
competing for foreign investments over-invest in specific industries. In
addition, the role of urban clusters should be modified in the international
level. For example, Hong Kong and Guangzhou would function as business
centers for a China + ASEAN 10 scheme. On the other hand, Shanghai and
Nanjing could be business centers for China + Japan and Korea.
While government strategic policies can accelerate the process of regional
development and promote a country’s development by stimulating a city or
a region’s economy, the selection of location is rarely unbiased. Thus, gov-
ernment policies must be implement only upon consideration of a region
potential factors and existing advantages.
Although Korea has a sound infrastructure that can enhance its domestic
economy, this does not automatically guarantee that Korea will become the
Business Hub of Northeast Asia. Even though Korean cities, such as
Incheon, Busan, and Seoul, are mutually complementary and have leading
industries, in order for Korea to become the center of Northeast Asia, it
must nurture the economic elements which were easily observed in Hong
Kong and Singapore. Besides infrastructure, Korea falls behind in all other
categories, including population, market, capital, or economic size. This fact
indicates that for now it is more realistic and feasible for Korea to increase
efforts into becoming a dynamic economy in Asia rather than the hub of
Northeast Asia.
In sum, while the Chinese regional development strategy was based on
economically plausible conditions supported by location theory, Korea’s
strategy was biased toward a political rationale, which disregarded the logic
of the market. In this regard, location theory reveals that the market knows
best; a concept that is in line with orthodox economics. The long-term suc-
cess of government initiated special economic zones depends heavily on
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finding compatible location elements supported by economic factors. Thus,
new towns, including areas and clusters, should be based on rational con-
sideration of economic needs, practical advantages, and diversified promo-
tional stimulations faithful to location theory.
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